Why does social psychological research on prejudice change across time? We argue that scientific change is not simply a result of empirical evidence, technological developments, or social controversies, but rather emerges out of social change-driven shifts in how researchers categorize themselves and others within their larger societies. As mainstream researchers increasingly recategorize former outgroup members as part of a novel ingroup, prejudice research shifts in support of emergent ingroup members against their emergent outgroup opponents. Although social change-driven science results in valuable opportunities for researchers, it also results in significant risks for research -collective, scientific biases in the inclusion and exclusion of social groups in prejudice research that are not readily detected or managed by traditional controls. We present the Emergent Ingroup Model (EIM) to encourage reflection on shared biases, as well as to spark a broader conversation on how to strengthen our field for a rapidly changing and increasingly global world.
Why does social psychological research on prejudice change across time? We argue that scientific change is not simply a result of empirical evidence, technological developments, or social controversies, but rather emerges out of social change-driven shifts in how researchers categorize themselves and others within their larger societies. As mainstream researchers increasingly recategorize former outgroup members as part of a novel ingroup, prejudice research shifts in support of emergent ingroup members against their emergent outgroup opponents. Although social change-driven science results in valuable opportunities for researchers, it also results in significant risks for research -collective, scientific biases in the inclusion and exclusion of social groups in prejudice research that are not readily detected or managed by traditional controls. We present the Emergent Ingroup Model (EIM) to encourage reflection on shared biases, as well as to spark a broader conversation on how to strengthen our field for a rapidly changing and increasingly global world.
In the 1920s, psychologists seriously tested ideas of White superiority. For instance, Thomas Garth (1925) published a Psychological Bulletin paper on the mental differences between White Americans and other ethnic groups. From his review, Garth concluded that 'these studies taken all together seem to indicate the mental superiority of the white race ' (p. 359) . During this period of overt racism, restrictive immigration, and widespread inequality, American psychology remained a largely White and male discipline (Samelson, 1978) . However, by the 1930s, psychologists derided the testing of White superiority as scientifically flawed and culturally biased against ethnic minorities. Garth (1934) even suggested that psychologists who studied racial differences in mental abilities 'might well take a standard test for race prejudice before undertaking a scientific study of the problem, so as to reveal any hidden motive to himself and others ' (p. 327) . With the rise of authoritarian governments in Europe, the migration of Jewish scholars to the United States, and the growing numbers of ethnic minorities entering psychology, the discipline *Correspondence should be addressed to Mark A. Ferguson, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 2100 Main Street, Stevens Point, WI 54481, USA (email: mark.ferguson@uwsp.edu).
had started to change. Indeed, the demise of 'racial psychology' helped to establish 'prejudice research' in social psychology (Samelson, 1978) .
This example raises an important question about the field of psychology -why does our science change? More specifically, why does it change in certain ways during particular periods in history? One possible explanation is that new empirical discoveries help to dispel problematic ideas from our discipline and perhaps, eventually, from the broader society (Buchler, 1940; Popper, 1963) . This explanation places an emphasis on research methods, substantive evidence, and self-correction in stimulating scientific change. It could be that racial psychology crumbled solely because no reasonable evidence for race differences could be found (Klineberg, 1935) . Although empirical evidence clearly played a role in this change, it does not explain exactly why such evidence was sought at this specific point in time, nor does it exhaust the range of plausible explanations. The discovery of empirical evidence might not represent a necessary or sufficient condition for creating scientific change in psychology (Kuhn, 1962; Longino, 1990) .
Another possible explanation is that social change reworks the intergroup boundaries that research is premised upon, which leads scientists to seek out and embrace new kinds of empirical evidence. This explanation places an emphasis on scientists' ingroup memberships and their own position within dynamic intergroup conflicts as stimulating scientific change. Not only had Garth failed to find clear evidence of racial differences, but he also started to socially identify with his minority research participants, primarily Native and Mexican Americans (Richards, 1998) . He would spend the rest of his career working to improve their life outcomes through academic research and government service. In this example, changing perceptions of ingroup membership encouraged the discovery of new evidence and arrival at a different conclusion.
This Landmark article examines scientific change in psychology, particularly in the field of prejudice research. We argue that scientific change represents a shift in how mainstream researchers categorize themselves and others, which facilitates a realignment of scientific efforts in support of emerging ingroups against their emerging outgroup opponents. Amid social change, researchers increasingly recategorize established outgroups as emergent ingroup members. This leads researchers to produce work that helps challenge emergent outgroup resistance -concepts, evidence, explanations, and interventions arise in support of these efforts. Even the definition of 'prejudice' itself (as flawed, faulty, or erroneous attitudes) comes to represent a label placed on people who oppose the recategorization efforts that define the emergent ingroup. As researchers use their scientific tools differently, they discover and embrace new sources of evidenceones that were previously overlooked or misinterpreted. Consequently, prejudice research comes to represent a type of collective, scientific action mobilized in support of group-interested social change.
We further argue that although social change-driven research agendas present important opportunities for prejudice researchers, they also present significant risks for prejudice research. In particular, they contribute to the development and persistence of collective, scientific biases in the inclusion and exclusion of social groups in prejudice work. Although these group-interested efforts undermine both our knowledge of prejudice and our ability to meaningfully engage the public, they are not readily detected or managed by traditional scientific controls (e.g., research methods or peer review) as they are widely shared and taken for granted by researchers. Thus, we suggest that a broader conversation on the role of collective interests (or biases) in prejudice research is needed -to help us reflect on our shared identities and their implications for the field.
For the purposes of this Landmark article, prejudice research refers to the scientific analysis of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination as it is known in mainstream social psychology (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010) . Furthermore, prejudice refers to group-based (or collective) emotions targeting outgroup members as it is known in intergroup emotions work (Mackie & Smith, 2015) . What becomes clear is that what is seen as 'prejudice' shifts with changes in intergroup boundaries (Reicher, 2012; Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 2012) . The focus of this article is on the social psychology of prejudice and the groups in the spotlight capturing scientific attention. We begin by considering the psychology of social change and its influence on scientific changes in prejudice research. Then, we discuss possible alternative explanations for these changes. We conclude by examining the consequences of social change-driven agendas and offering suggestions about how to encourage research that better represents prejudice as it manifests across distinct intergroup contexts.
A psychology of social change
Over the past century, the world has witnessed numerous social changes, including international migrations, economic declines, world wars, mass genocides, and rights movements. In response, researchers have asked many questions about what social change is (Allport, 1924) , what causes it to begin (Katz, 1974) , and why might it eventually end (Lewin, 1947) . Moreover, they have asked many questions about psychological responses to social change: Why people think that social change is possible or taking place (Turner & Brown, 1978) , why they support change that others resist (Watson, 1966) , and why they resist change that others support (Clark, 1965) . Indeed, Tajfel (1972) suggested that the 'psychological aspects of social change at all levels are the proper subject matter of social psychology' (p. 115). The answers are important -not only for understanding social change, but also for understanding social stability.
We developed the Emergent Ingroup Model (EIM; see Figure 1 ) to help explain how social change can arise in society, as well as how social change can influence prejudice research over time. This model is grounded in the social identity perspective (Haslam, Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010) and explains social change in terms of dynamic ingroup memberships and intergroup relations. More specifically, we argue that social change is an achievement (or outcome of intergroup conflict) that reflects shifting intergroup boundaries (Drury & Reicher, 2018) . These boundaries shape, and are shaped by, thoughts, feelings, and behaviours supporting particular groups over others in society -including those embedded in the everyday, scientific practices of prejudice researchers. Given that social psychologists are also citizens, changes in their valued ingroup memberships likely play an important role in research contributions. Thus, to understand scientific change in prejudice research, we must first consider social change in society.
Perceived ingroup membership
Based on self-categorization theory (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) , the EIM describes ingroup membership in terms of self-categorization and prototypicality. Selfcategorization refers to the perceived differentiation of people into ingroups and outgroups in a particular intergroup context . When perceivers see social groups as sharing a common ingroup membership with themselves (e.g., American, middle class, social psychologist, atheist, Democrat, or human), these groups have been categorized as ingroup members; when they do not, these groups have been categorized as outgroup members. Self-categorization is important because it shapes the perceived legitimacy of social groups (Spears, 2008) . When people are categorized as ingroup members, their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours are generally viewed as more acceptable than those of outgroup members, even when harmful to others (Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) .
Prototypicality refers to the perceptual alignment of people with those who reflect the defining features of their ingroup in a particular intergroup context (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2015) . People can be perceived as more or less prototypical ingroup members. When perceivers see social groups as better than others with respect to favourably differentiating a shared ingroup from outgroups (e.g., as more competent or moral), these groups are seen as prototypical members; when they do not, these groups are seen as peripheral members (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2006) . Prototypicality is important because it shapes the power (i.e., group influence) accorded to group members (Suba si c, Reynolds, & Mohamed, 2015) . When ingroup members are seen as prototypical, their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours generally gain more ingroup support than those of peripherals, even when harmful to others (Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012) .
A number of social groups are likely to be seen as ingroup members by mainstream perceivers in American society (Figure 1 , right side). The list includes prototypical
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Mobilization of ingroup support ingroups such as doctors and engineers who have long been seen as acceptable in society (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Fiske, 2018) . Also included are peripheral ingroups such as ethnic and sexual minorities who are increasingly seen as acceptable in society (Crandall, Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013) . Conversely, other groups are likely to be seen as outgroup members by mainstream perceivers in American society ( Figure 1 , left side). This includes prototypical outgroups such as drug users and sex workers who have long been seen as unacceptable in society (Crandall et al., 2002; Fiske, 2018) and peripheral outgroups such as racists and sexists who have increasingly been seen as unacceptable in society (Crandall et al., 2013) .
Dynamic intergroup relations
Based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) , the EIM describes intergroup relations in terms of social change and social stability. Social change refers to the emergence of novel intergroup boundaries in society, which represent tangible 'cognitive alternatives' to the status quo (Turner & Brown, 1978) . As social change occurs, perceivers begin to recategorize established outgroup targets as emergent ingroup members, and perhaps hitherto established ingroup targets as emergent outgroup members. This recategorization is important as it provides emergent ingroup members with more legitimacy to challenge the established norms of social categorization embedded in larger societal institutions (e.g., cultural, economic, judicial, or scientific; Zhang, Jetten, Iyer, & Cui, 2013) . This suggests that institutional practices secure, disseminate, and manage intergroup boundaries -essentially enabling ingroup identities and constraining outgroup identities (Haslam, 2014; Haslam et al., 2015) . In effect, social change helps people to imagine new ways of categorizing ingroups and outgroups, which inspires hope for working towards a better future together . Social stability refers to the embeddedness of existing intergroup boundaries in society, which represent tangible 'reality constraints' on new forms of categorization (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Spears, 2010) . As social change progresses, perceivers begin to see emergent ingroup members as better than others at favourably differentiating their new, more inclusive ingroup from its emergent outgroup opponents (Suba si c et al., 2015) . This enables emergent ingroup members to become more prototypical, as well as for others to mobilize in support of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Prototypicality shifts are important because they transfer support to emergent ingroup members, which gives them the power needed to establish new norms of categorization in larger societal institutions (Suba si c, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008) . This suggests that new institutional practices reflect the modification of intergroup boundaries -essentially redefining who counts as ingroup members rather than outgroup members (a change that emergent outgroups would generally contest; Eidelman & Crandall, 2014) . In effect, social stability helps people to establish new ways of categorizing ingroups and outgroups, enabling the emergent ingroup and its interests to become normalized in society .
A number of social groups have been increasingly recategorized as emergent ingroup members by mainstream perceivers in American society (Figure 1 , bottom left to bottom right; Eagly & Diekman, 2005) . This includes a wide range of groups, including those based on ethnic heritage (e.g., Polish, Italian, and African Americans), religious beliefs (e.g., Jewish, Catholic, and Muslim), gender and sexuality (e.g., women, gay men, and lesbians), and physical status (e.g., elderly, overweight, and mental disorders). Additionally, a number of groups have been increasingly recategorized as emergent outgroup members by mainstream perceivers (Figure 1 , top right to top left; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, & Mewse, 2011) . This includes groups such as those based on politics or religion (e.g., racists, sexists, and religious fundamentalists) and vocation or lifestyle choices (e.g., farmers, homemakers, and smokers). Indeed, as social groups are increasingly recategorized as emergent ingroup members, they are seen as more legitimate than emergent outgroup members (Suba si c, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011) .
Summary and clarifications
In sum, the EIM puts dynamic intergroup boundaries at the heart of social change in society. When social change occurs, people begin to imagine new, shared identities that could encourage hope for a better future together. Nonetheless, for these emergent identities to endure, they must become prototypical for ingroup members more generally. Present intergroup conflicts over the inclusion and exclusion of Arabs and Muslims in Western societies remind us that social change is a contest for group influence, as well as that vigilance is required for achieving a new social stability (Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018; Suba si c et al., 2008) . By becoming seen as more prototypical, emergent ingroup members can muster the support needed to gain established ingroup membership -to secure novel group boundaries within larger societal institutions.
However, understanding the EIM requires keeping two points in mind. First, perceivers have specific positions within particular intergroup contexts (Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Turner, & Ryan, 2004) . For instance, when majorities and minorities selfcategorize as American, they might nonetheless differ in who they perceive as ingroup or outgroup members and who they perceive as prototypical or peripheral ingroup members. It is probable that people on distinct sides of an intergroup conflict will vary in readiness to recategorize others as ingroup members, as well as to lend them their support. Furthermore, people can self-categorize at more or less inclusive levels of categorization (Turner, 1999) . Within a more inclusive, international context, people could self-categorize as North Americans and see Canadians as more ingroup prototypical than Mexicans. Conversely, within a less inclusive, interethnic context, people could selfcategorize as African Americans and see African heritage as more ingroup prototypical than Caribbean heritage (Waters, Kasinitz, & Asad, 2014) . Given the flexible and dynamic nature of self-categories , the EIM necessitates clarity about the intergroup context in question and sensitivity to how this particular context changes over time.
Second, the process of social change is not smooth, nor is its outcome certain. There is no universal trend for greater ingroup acceptance of outgroup members within society. Some social groups might be readily recategorized as ingroup members, gain broad support, and quickly rise to established ingroup membership (Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016) . However, there are many possible outcomes of intergroup conflict. Some groups might be recategorized as ingroup members, but struggle to gain adequate support to fully overcome outgroup resistance and become established ingroup members (e.g., women or African Americans; Suba si c et al., 2008). Other groups might be recategorized as ingroup members initially, but this new ingroup might crumble because of outgroup resistance and restabilization of established categorization norms (e.g., Muslim or transgender targets; Crandall et al., 2018) . Still others might never be recategorized as ingroup members and continue to face overt prejudice and discrimination (e.g., homeless people or sex workers), irrespective of the progress made by other stigmatized groups (North & Fiske, 2014) . Indeed, if social change efforts fall short, emergent ingroups (as well as their established ingroup allies) could suffer considerable backlash Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, & Phelan, 2012) . Thus, social change reflects a struggle for group influence in society whose outcome remains uncertain.
Application to scientific behaviour
From an EIM view, social change has consistently played an important role in scientific change in prejudice research. As members of their larger societies, prejudice researchers are subject to the influence of shifting intergroup boundaries, whether inside or outside of academic psychology (Gordon, 2015) . When social change commences, mainstream researchers begin to recategorize established outgroups as part of their emerging ingroup in society . Consequently, researchers start to produce work on prejudices that seem to threaten their shared group interests -negative emotions experienced by emergent outgroups towards emergent ingroups. As emergent ingroup members gradually gain support in society, researchers shift the way that they conduct their work until targets become established ingroup members (Forscher & Devine, 2016) . This analysis seems to apply to the most widely studied prejudices, including those based on ethnic heritage, gender and sexuality, and physical status. Social change inspires researchers to see formerly neglected emotions as new and interesting issues to pursue (Crandall et al., 2013) .
Thus, scientific change in prejudice research represents the reallocation of our collective efforts in support of group-interested social change. At the collective level, intergroup conflict can produce social change that influences scientific knowledge (see Figure 2 ). However, these collective-level processes are mediated through individuallevel changes in scientific behaviour. Social change encourages researchers to use their scientific tools in different ways -leading to discoveries overlooked by their predecessors (Kagan, 2009) . They foster novel interpretations and applications that help to strengthen their intellectual justification. As discoveries become sufficiently justified as important, they become part of the larger body of scientific knowledge. This embeds group boundaries in prejudice research and promotes their dissemination to wider professional and public audiences. In sum, emergent social identities serve as catalysts for the creative theoretical and empirical practices underlying scientific change in prejudice research (Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Jans, 2013) . 
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Making scientific discoveries The assertion that prejudice research is a form of collective action supporting emergent ingroup members is validated by examination of how researchers arrive at scientific discoveries in our field. That is, why are some discoveries made and not others? Why did early researchers develop an interest in anti-Black prejudice but not anti-gay prejudice (Herek, 2010) ? Why did they collect data on anti-Catholic prejudice but not anti-atheist prejudice (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011) ? Moreover, why does the nature of these discoveries stay the same or change over time? Why do current researchers measure implicit anti-Asian prejudice but not implicit anti-Italian prejudice (Katz & Braly, 1933) ? Why do they employ neuroscientific measures to assess sexist bias but not anti-homeless bias (Dovidio, Pearson, & Orr, 2008) ? We argue that social change in how mainstream researchers categorize themselves and others into ingroups and outgroups in society influences scientific discoveries in prejudice research (Reicher, 2012) .
For instance, social change influences the phenomena that prejudice researchers consider interesting and important, as well as the concepts that they create and employ to understand them (Duckitt, 2010) . As mainstream researchers recategorize former outgroup members as part of an emerging ingroup, they become interested in studying emotions targeting their new ingroup members. Widespread social change and smaller scale disciplinary change (e.g., influx of diverse groups into universities as students and colleagues) helped ethnic, religious, gender and sexuality, and physical status groups to become staples of prejudice research. Shared identities -whether based on nationality, social class, occupation, religious beliefs, politics, humanity, or other social group memberships -led negative emotions targeting new ingroup members to be seen as illegitimate or irrational, and hence, 'prejudices' (Allport, 1944) .
As social change progresses, researchers modify concepts to reflect changes in emergent outgroup resistance in society. For instance, early researchers conceptualized prejudices as overt or explicit emotions (e.g., anger or pride) that were openly expressed in society (Allport, 1960) . Such descriptions were based on intergroup conflicts in which outgroup resistance was stronger than ingroup support in the larger society (Dixon, 2017) . In this context, prejudices might seem legitimate and thus be openly expressed in mainstream society. Nevertheless, current researchers increasingly conceptualize prejudice as subtle or implicit emotions (e.g., guilt or anxiety) that are hidden in society (Monteith, Parker, & Burns, 2016) . Such descriptions are based on conflicts in which ingroup support is stronger than outgroup resistance in society (Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016) . In this context, prejudices might seem illegitimate and thus be consciously concealed in mainstream society. Amid social change, researchers retrofit the concept of prejudice to keep the focus on emergent outgroup members.
Moreover, social change influences the particular empirical data that researchers choose to collect. As mainstream researchers become interested in studying emotions targeting their emergent ingroup, they begin to develop research that helps them to identify people who feel these specific emotions -emergent outgroup members . Researchers construct a wide range of measures (Fiske & North, 2015) and manipulations (Gaertner, 1973 ) that help sort participants into ingroup and outgroup members. Participants whose responses seem biased against ethnic, religious, gender and sexuality, or physical status groups are labelled as outgroup members (e.g., prejudiced, intolerant, or bigoted), whereas those whose responses seem biased in favour of these same groups are labelled as ingroup members (e.g., non-prejudiced, tolerant, or egalitarian). Thus, researchers consistently use empirical measures and manipulations to determine the different sides in particular intergroup conflicts -those that threaten emergent ingroup interests.
As social change progresses, researchers modify the kinds of data that they collect to reflect changes in emergent outgroup resistance in society. For instance, early researchers developed self-report measures (Guilford, 1931) and experimental paradigms (LaPiere, 1934) that helped identify outgroup members through overt indicators of emotions targeting ingroup members. In a context where outgroup resistance was stronger than ingroup support, it was relatively easy to ascertain outgroup membership through overt methods. Conversely, current researchers develop self-report measures (Sears & Henry, 2005) and experimental paradigms (Devine, 1989 ) that help identify outgroup members via increasingly subtle indicators of emotions targeting ingroup members. As ingroup support becomes stronger than outgroup resistance, it is increasingly difficult to identify outgroup members via overt methods. Therefore, researchers modify the kinds of data that they collect when the existing methods no longer serve group interests. Such modifications keep the empirical focus on emergent outgroup members.
Providing scientific justifications
Social change also influences the explanations (i.e., results and interpretations) that prejudice researchers offer to justify why discoveries are scientifically valuable contributions to the field (Crandall et al., 2013) . As mainstream researchers identify emergent outgroups in their work, they begin to see explanations that delegitimize outgroup resistance as valuable contributions. This includes work that explains how outgroups threaten ingroups. Researchers repeatedly describe outgroups as behaving in ways that devalue, victimize, and diminish ingroups' life outcomes (Major & Townsend, 2010) . This also includes work that explains why outgroups threaten ingroups. Researchers repeatedly describe outgroups as having unsavoury characteristics, such as ignorance (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016) , closed-mindedness (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011) , low intelligence (Dhont & Hodson, 2014) , intolerance (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012) , authoritarianism (Sidanius, Cotterill, Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Carvacho, 2017) , impulsiveness (Monteith et al., 2016) , and irrationality (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969) . Thus, explanations for how and why emergent outgroup resistance is harmful to emergent ingroup interests -in effect, hardening intergroup boundaries by treating them as fixed properties of certain individuals -are more likely to be considered valuable and become a part of scientific knowledge (Haidt, 2016) .
As social change progresses, researchers modify scientific explanations to reflect changes in outgroup resistance in society. For instance, early researchers explained that openly hostile intentions led outgroups to express threatening emotions towards ingroups (Forscher & Devine, 2016) . These expressions were thought to encourage overt discrimination in society (Lippitt & Radke, 1946) . In this context, explanations that delegitimized outgroups' overt resistance were seen as valuable contributions. Nonetheless, current researchers explain the absence of openly expressed, threatening emotions by outgroups as concealed or unconscious intentions towards ingroups. The absence of expression is thought to contribute to subtle discrimination in society (Dovidio, 2001) . In this context, explanations that delegitimize outgroups' subtle or implicit resistance are seen as valuable contributions. Amid social change, researchers modify scientific explanations (e.g., by explaining a lack of results as prejudice 'gone underground'; Tetlock & Arkes, 2004) to keep the focus on explaining outgroup threats to ingroup members, rather than refocusing their efforts on groups who are better represented by the prevailing views on what counts as a scientifically valuable contribution (e.g., overt prejudice towards homeless people).
Moreover, social change influences the social interventions that prejudice researchers develop as practically valuable contributions to society. As mainstream researchers identify emergent outgroups in their work, they begin to see interventions that demobilize outgroup support as valuable contributions. For example, researchers developed strategies to marginalize outgroup emotion norms (Crandall & Stangor, 2005) , encourage self-regulation of outgroup emotions (Monteith et al., 2016) , and directly confront outgroup emotions (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012) . Such strategies discourage people from self-categorizing as outgroup members (O'Brien et al., 2010), as well as discouraging possible coalitions between ingroup and outgroup members (Dixon et al., 2015) .
In addition, researchers begin to see interventions that mobilize ingroup support as valuable contributions. For example, researchers developed strategies to increase the salience of ingroup over outgroup social identities, including fostering optimal group contacts (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) , practicing adoption of the ingroups' perspectives (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) , and cultivating common ingroup goals (Gaertner, Dovidio, Guerra, Hehman, & Saguy, 2016) . Such strategies encourage people to employ more inclusive self-categories (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004) , as well as encouraging possible coalitions between ingroup and outgroup members (Suba si c et al., 2011). Thus, researchers seem to value social interventions that promote greater support for emergent ingroups over emergent outgroups -helping to transform ingroups into stronger forces for group-interested social change.
Summary and implications
In sum, the EIM suggests that prejudice research has long served as a form of collective action supporting group-interested social change. As mainstream researchers recategorize former outgroup members as emergent ingroup members, they become interested in understanding the emotions targeting their new ingroup. These emotions -sought out in outgroup members -are seen as important to explain and change in society (Reicher, 2012) . Thus, researchers shape their work to support the interests of emergent ingroup members on their way to established ingroup membership. This analysis seems consistent with the rise of several targeted groups in prejudice research over the last century, whether based on ethnicity, religion, gender/sexuality, or physical status (Duckitt, 2010) .
Group interests help to solve a critical 'selection problem' in science -what research is interesting and important enough to conduct and publish (Durrheim et al., 2016) ? Researchers might become interested in studying emotions targeting outgroup members (e.g., drug users or sex workers). They could create measures and manipulations that help them to identify, explain, and change ingroup members (e.g., Americans or middle-class people) who have such emotions. However, they do not. Shared group interests help researchers choose among the many emotions available for study at a given point in history. They help them to know what emotions are ingroup relevant and thus important for scientific examination. As researchers' shared identities change, their scientific interests and contributions change along with them to maintain support for emergent ingroup members.
Group interests also help to explain why research begins, changes, or ceases altogether -the level of perceived threat towards emergent ingroups from emergent outgroups (de la Sablonniere, 2017). When researchers recategorize, they perceive a higher level of threat towards emergent ingroup members. This recategorization is initially tenuous and vulnerable to outgroup resistance . As social change progresses, other members of society might recategorize as researchers do, but still not offer sufficient support to embed emergent identities in society . However, as emergent ingroups seem to reach established ingroup membership, researchers then perceive a lower level of threat towards these groups. This leads them to end research on these targets altogether. When emergent ingroup members seem to be firmly established and protected by larger societal institutions, researchers no longer consider emotions targeting them to be interesting or important for research (Tetlock & Arkes, 2004) .
Possible alternative explanations
We believe that the EIM provides a plausible explanation for why scientific change happens in prejudice research. As researchers recategorize former outgroup members as part of their emergent ingroup in society, they develop research in support of this new in group against its emergent outgroup opponents. This support continues until emergent ingroup members seem to become established ingroup members.
Nonetheless, it is useful to consider possible alternative explanations. For an alternative explanation to be plausible, it would need to solve the 'selection problem' in science. That is, it would need to explain why prejudice researchers study certain emotions over others in the larger society (Crandall et al., 2002) . Why not study all possible group-based emotions? It would also need to explain why researchers change how they examine specific emotions at particular points in time (Crandall et al., 2013) . Why not study overt and subtle emotions continuously over time? Without answering both questions, the explanation is not a plausible alternative. We consider two groups of possible alternatives: sociohistorical (which appeal to larger social and historical processes) and social psychological (which appeal to distinct mental processes).
Sociohistorical explanations
One possible group of alternative explanations for scientific change in prejudice research are sociohistorical explanations. For example, it is possible that prominent controversies in society lead to scientific change (Benjamin & Crouse, 2002) . This explanation suggests that major shifts in public discourse, public opinion, or public policy lead to greater awareness of targeted groups and research attention in the field. One could point to changes such as the end of legalized segregation in schools, school bussing policies, or affirmative action and suggest that researchers simply respond to the newsworthy events of their day. This response would be consistent with suggestions that prejudice is an applied field within social psychology that appropriately evolves alongside of shifts in public consciousness. Thus, theorizing about emergent identities is unnecessary or represents an outcome of ongoing social discourse.
The difficulty is that social controversy does not adequately explain why researchers focus more on some controversies than others, nor why their focus shifts over time. For instance, during the 1960s, why did prejudice researchers focus more on the US Civil Rights Movement than on the Vietnam War (e.g., anti-Black emotions rather than antisoldier ones)? Why did they emphasize African Americans as a targeted group, but wait another decade to do so for women, despite their prominence in the struggle for civil rights (Biernat & Deaux, 2012) ? Presumably, all of these events and targeted groups were salient during this time, but sociohistorical explanations do not explain why researchers attend to some controversies more than others. Therefore, social controversy explanations fail to answer the questions that they purport to. Emergent identities provide the impetus for social controversies (to be perceived as relevant and important for the group). Research does not evolve in response to growing awareness, but rather in response to emerging intergroup biases (Durrheim et al., 2016) .
Furthermore, it is possible that new technological developments lead to scientific change (Fiske, Harris, Lee, & Russell, 2016) . This explanation suggests that advances in design, measurement, or analysis lead to scientific changes in prejudice research. One could argue that the development of self-report measures (Likert, 1932) was critical for the development of prejudice research. One could also argue that implicit and neuroscience measures (Amodio, 2014) made it feasible to study increasingly subtle manifestations of prejudice in more rigorous ways. In fact, it would be hard to discuss the transition from old-fashioned to modern forms of prejudice without noting the scientific tools available to researchers. When technologies become part of our toolbox, they allow us to gather different data, develop novel theories, and create new interventions to make a difference in society.
The difficulty is that the new technology explanation does not adequately explain why technologies are used for some purposes over others, nor why new technologies are developed over time. Why is new technology used to understand prejudices towards particular groups in specific intergroup contexts, rather than others? Why use implicit measures to study anti-Black prejudice, but not anti-Italian, anti-Polish, anti-Catholic, or the many other prejudices that were once staples in our field (Allport & Kramer, 1946) ? Presumably, overt prejudice scores would be reasonably low for such groups. Why do implicit measures of anti-male, anti-conservative, anti-White, anti-rich, or anti-religious prejudice not generate much interest among researchers? How about anti-homeless, antisex worker, or anti-drug user prejudices? All of those prejudices are likely plentiful in society (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014) . Would there be a strong emphasis on implicit or neuroscience measures if prejudices towards African Americans continued to show up on self-report measures (Jones & Sigall, 1971) ? Even if so, why would researchers view the results as compelling or convincing contributions? Therefore, technological explanations for scientific change fall short because they overlook why tools are created in the first place, as well as what they are used for. Emergent identities stimulate the development of new technologies and foster novel uses of them over time. The data that they produce are more compelling and convincing when they are aligned with emerging ingroup interests (Haslam et al., 2013 ).
Social psychological explanations
Another possible group of alternative explanations for scientific change in prejudice research are social psychological. For instance, it is possible that researchers' liberal political ideology contributes to scientific change (Haidt, 2016; Tetlock, 2012) . This explanation suggests that researchers focus their work on disadvantaged groups that are protected by their political beliefs. They are social activists and vanguards of political change. Indeed, this would seem consistent with the fact that researchers examine groups such as those based on ethnicity and gender/sexuality in their work (Dovidio et al., 2010) . Moreover, this explanation suggests that researchers change their work to reflect changes in the treatment of disadvantaged groups over time. Again, this seems consistent with the shifting focus from old-fashioned to modern forms of prejudice (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Pearson, 2017) . Indeed, the influence of politics in prejudice research has been cited in work on ideological conflict (Brandt, 2017) , concept creep (Haslam, 2016) , and politics and science (Duarte et al., 2015) . From this view, there is no need to consider emergent social identities. If they matter at all, they reflect the effects of researchers' underlying political beliefs as related to specific social groups at particular points in time.
The difficulty is that liberal ideology does not explain why researchers fail to support some disadvantaged groups in society, nor why their support of groups varies over time. For instance, researchers do not study prejudices towards established outgroups in society, such as homeless people, sex workers, or drug users (Crandall et al., 2013) . These groups are socially excluded to the point of being criminalized. The omission of such disadvantaged targets from research seems potentially more 'conservative' than 'liberal'. Furthermore, before social change, prejudice researchers seem to leave disadvantaged groups to other subfields of psychology, such as clinical or counselling psychology. Such fields seem more inclined to treat collective struggles as personal problems -encouraging individual change rather than collective action to cope with inequalities (Haslam, 2014) . As a result, it is plausible that researchers could perceptually align themselves with advantaged groups in different social contexts. This possibility raises important questions about the conditions under which researchers could become indifferent to, enable, or even participate in, human rights abuses (Elkins, 2016; Herek, 2010; Klineberg, 1935) . There is little reason to privilege political identity over human, national, class, religious, scientific, or others as the solitary and immutable basis for emergent ingroups within social psychology.
It is also possible that intergroup contact between mainstream researchers and disadvantaged groups leads to scientific change . This explanation suggests that researchers might have personal or professional experiences with disadvantaged groups, which reduces biases, promotes awareness, and elicits scientific change supporting such groups. Indeed, many researchers have written about how personal contacts have influenced their career directions (Crandall & Schaller, 2005) . In addition, shifting demographics of who researchers encounter as students, colleagues, and participants foster contacts that could lead to scientific change. Thomas Garth's contacts with his newer Jewish colleagues in psychology, as well as his minority participants, appear to support this alternative (Richards, 1998) . From this view, there is no need to think about emergent social identities. If they occur at all, they are a downstream outcome of the contacts between researchers and disadvantaged groups.
The difficulty is that intergroup contact does not explain why opportunities for contact actually arise, nor why researchers' receptiveness to them varies over time. Although contact could certainly contribute to social change, it seems more likely that social change fosters the opportunities for contact between mainstream researchers and disadvantaged groups, particularly on the scale needed to explain scientific change (Kagan, 2009 ). In such a context, researchers and disadvantaged group members would have the opportunity to recategorize each other as ingroup members, and thus encourage diversity in our field and its work. Moreover, researchers' receptiveness to contact likely varies across time (Boxer & Carrier, 1998) . Thus, contact explanations fall short because they do not explain why contact actually happens or why researchers would be receptive to it in the first place. Emergent ingroup identities energize intergroup conflicts that foster social change and create new opportunities for contact, whereas receptiveness to contact varies as a function of self-categorization Thomas et al., 2015) . Although contact may be sufficient for promoting shared ingroup identities, there is no reason to expect that contact is likely (or even necessary for identities) to emerge in society.
Summary and implications
In sum, the EIM provides a more plausible explanation of scientific change in prejudice research than other potential alternatives. Emergent ingroup identities help to explain why work on certain prejudices develops and work on others does not, as well as why this work changes across time. Scientific change in prejudice research does not seem to simply boil down to inherent aversions to (or situational reductions of) ignorance, so much as the emergence of new biases in response to social change within society (Durrheim et al., 2016) . When researchers recategorize former outgroups as emergent ingroup members, this shared identity is integrated into and lived out through scientific work. It becomes the foundation for developing concepts, collecting data, interpreting findings, and applying them in the real world . Such research continues to shift alongside social change and ends once the threat from emergent outgroups seems to subside in the larger society. Although other, more plausible alternatives for scientific change are certainly possible (Droogendyk et al., 2016) , their existence would not necessarily preclude the importance of emergent social identities in shaping prejudice research.
Effects on scientific contributions
Thus far, we have argued that prejudice research has been shaped by social change and as a result represents a form of collective, scientific action on behalf of emergent ingroup members. Indeed, social change-driven research has had many positive effects on our field. It has fostered the development of advanced measurement tools (Fiske & North, 2015) and practical interventions (Paluck, 2012) for prejudice reduction. It has helped to keep our field vibrant and diverse, as new recruits consistently dedicate their lives to studying emerging prejudices in society. Moreover, social change-driven research has had many positive effects on society more generally. It has helped us to improve the well-being of emergent ingroup members in schools (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997) , workplaces (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) , and courtrooms (Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991) . Some successes were truly historic, such as in the US Supreme Court's 1954 Brown versus Board of Education decision that struck down legalized segregation in public schools (Benjamin & Crouse, 2002) . Without a doubt, support for emergent ingroup members has benefited the field and society more generally.
Nonetheless, social change-driven research has had a number of negative effects as well. In particular, it has contributed to the development and proliferation of collective, scientific biases -unacknowledged intergroup commitments in work that undermine our knowledge and make it harder to meaningfully engage with the broader society (Does et al., 2018; Haidt, 2016; Reynolds et al., 2012) . Collective biases are generally about the content of research, rather than the methods of research -they are about what we use our research tools for, rather than about how we use them or whether we use them properly (cf. Pettigrew, 2008) . The difficulty is that collective biases are not adequately detected or managed by traditional scientific controls, such as research methods and peer review. When researchers share biases towards the same social groups, they might not recognize these biases or consider them problematic. Consequently, our collective biases go unchecked -they persist in everyday habits, are tacitly transmitted through graduate training, and endure across generations. When scientific tools are consistently used for the same purposes, this reproduces the underlying goal of prejudice work -supporting emergent ingroups in their ongoing conflicts against emergent outgroups (Billig, 2012) .
Limited collective knowledge
One way that collective bias negatively affects prejudice research is by limiting our knowledge of prejudice across distinct group memberships and intergroup relations (Cartwright, 1979) . For instance, collective bias contributes to considerable theoretical fragmentation, which results in piecemeal theorizing about the range of prejudices within society (Reynolds, Suba si c, Batalha, & Jones, 2017) . Although we have considerable knowledge of prejudices targeting emergent ingroup members, we have much less knowledge of prejudices targeting established ingroup members or outgroup members more generally. This includes the prejudices held by emergent ingroups themselves. Such prejudices are likely alive and well (Johnson, Ashburn-Nardo, & Lecci, 2013 ) and failing to consider them more deeply leaves us poorly equipped to understand how prejudices operate in intergroup contexts beyond those traditionally studied.
Another type of fragmentation concerns the piecemeal meta-theoretical perspectives in prejudice research (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012) . For instance, prejudice research can be roughly divided into intragroup and intergroup perspectives (Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 2012) . Intragroup perspectives (Amodio, 2014; Forscher & Devine, 2014) view prejudice as a cause of conflict and propose reducing conflict through individual change. They focus on the efforts of dominant groups to oppress subordinate groups as a way to maintain their position in society (Sidanius et al., 2017) . They value fairness and encourage prejudice reduction to change dominant group emotions and bring them in line with emerging categorization norms. Conversely, intergroup perspectives (Haslam et al., 2010; Mackie & Smith, 2015) view conflict as a cause of prejudice and propose resolving it through social change. They focus on efforts of subordinate groups to resist dominant groups as a way to change their position in society. They value equality and encourage the development of collective action to contest the prevailing intergroup relations and establish new categorization norms (Wright & Baray, 2012) . The difficulty is that researchers working in these traditions often ground their work in different values (Dixon et al., 2012) , as well as treat intragroup and intergroup processes as distinct levels of analysis, despite their influence on each other (Jetten & Postmes, 2006) . Such fragmentation means that collective bias impedes the recognition that reality looks different from the distinct sides of an intergroup boundary. That is, social groups differ in their perception and experience of reality as a function of their group membership and position in the intergroup relationship (Drury & Reicher, 2018) . This relativity does not invariably suggest that some social groups are more 'rational' than others, but rather that intergroup perception and experience is a collectively plural, partial, and veridical process -it reflects shared interests shaped by conflicts (Spears, 2010) . As a result, individual group members' thoughts, feelings, and behaviours cannot be adequately understood apart from intergroup conflicts as they represent relational properties, rather than individual ones. The perception and experience of reality as a group-based process has been extensively documented in work on group attention (Shteynberg et al., 2014) , group memory (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010) , and group emotion (van Kleef & Fischer, 2016) .
Nonetheless, researchers regularly label outgroup members' perceptions and experiences of reality as personally biased or irrational (Oakes, 2004) . Indeed, definitions of prejudice laden with intergroup criticisms (e.g., faulty, ignorant, or irrational) represent collective bias at work (Maass, Arcuri, & Suitner, 2014; Reynolds et al., 2012) . The fact that outgroup members consistently think, feel, and behave differently than researchers does not necessarily mean that they are irrational. It means that they are on the other side of an intergroup conflict, one which disagrees with or contests the social realities favoured by researchers. The tendency to overlook or discount outgroup realities in intergroup relationships leaves us with theorizing that is overfitted to a narrow range of targeted groups in specific intergroup conflicts (Jahoda, 2016) . It also leaves us with theorizing that does not build robust links between the personal and collective factors that shape the emotional lives of group members (Parkinson & Manstead, 2015) .
Moreover, collective bias contributes to a relative lack of cumulative knowledge, which limits empirical development in prejudice research. Indeed, social psychology has been fraught with multiple 'crises' of confidence in its work -the first in the 1960s and 1970s (Elms, 1975; Ring, 1967) , as well as the present 'reproducibility crisis' (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) . From an EIM view, collective bias contributes to such crises in at least two ways. First, it leads to an incomplete evidence base that does not help us to anticipate or adapt to changes in the intergroup relations that our work is premised upon (Jones, 2010) . When researchers exclude a number of prejudices from empirical consideration (Crandall et al., 2013) , they could struggle to replicate results on prejudices that they actually do study when the intergroup relations that underpin them change. Second, collective bias could promote the use of questionable research practices (Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Stevens, & Duarte, 2016 ) that make our evidence less robust to changes in intergroup relations. It could be that questionable practices are not simply explained by ignorance or selfishness, but also by commitment to group-interested social change (Inbar & Lammers, 2012) . In either instance, collective bias could undermine empirical progress in prejudice research.
Such non-cumulative evidence suggests that collective bias hinders the realization that reality is actually a moving target in our research. There is a tendency in prejudice research to treat ingroup memberships and intergroup relations as relatively fixed or unchanging features existing in nature (Turner, 2006) . For instance, researchers have described social categories such as ethnicity, gender, or age as 'basic' categories of reality (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990 ) and prejudices as attitudes grounded in the biology of their holders (Allport & Schanck, 1936; Sidanius et al., 2017) . Still, a relative lack of cumulative knowledge suggests that reality is simply not static -ingroup memberships and intergroup relations are dynamic, flexible, and hold the potential for change . The categories and attitudes seen as 'basic' are linked with long-standing intergroup conflicts (North & Fiske, 2014) . When we see reality as static, we might find ourselves repeatedly starting over (Turner & Reynolds, 2003) . For instance, researchers might end up re-debating the concept of prejudice (Tetlock & Arkes, 2004) or how to promote positive intergroup relations (Wright & Baray, 2012) . When we see reality as static, we might also find ourselves making up for lost time. For instance, researchers (Esses, Deaux, Lalonde, & Brown, 2010) have recently demonstrated renewed interest in issues of immigration after decades of neglect (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1919) . In effect, collective bias leaves us without the solid and comprehensive evidence base needed to anticipate changes in ingroup memberships and intergroup relations over time.
Limited public engagement Another way that collective bias negatively affects prejudice research is by limiting our ability to meaningfully engage with our larger societies (Tropp, 2018) . For instance, if collective bias contributes to repeated 'crises' in psychology, it also potentially weakens public confidence in our knowledge. When researchers use questionable research practices and key empirical findings do not replicate, this can lead the public -citizens, policymakers, or even ourselves -to lose trust in our knowledge (Fiske, 2015) . Indeed, if we habitually characterize outgroup members negatively (e.g., as irrational, lazy, or stupid), this situation could even prove more difficult (Dhont & Hodson, 2014) . It could make it appear like researchers are politicized and open to imposing their non-scientific values on others (Haidt, 2016; Jussim et al., 2016) .
Furthermore, collective bias contributes to the selective exclusion of suffering from our work, which conveys indifference or disrespect towards others' experiences (Herek, 2010) . When we overlook the needs or misery of specific social groups but not others, it could lead the omitted groups to feel even more excluded -as if their suffering is irrelevant or acceptable to the field. For example, homeless people suffer considerable prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination in society (Johnstone, Jetten, Dingle, Parsell, & Walter, 2015) . Why do we need to wait until social change occurs to recategorize homeless people as ingroup members and to begin to widely study prejudice towards them? Why did we wait so long to begin studying anti-gay and antitransgender prejudices? Indeed, not only does excluding the suffering of others seem disrespectful, it could also contribute to structural discrimination and violence towards group members (Christie, 2006) . For example, while many researchers continue to overlook prejudice targeting homeless people, major cities increasingly pass laws that treat homelessness as a crime: putting spikes on benches or sidewalks, tearing down homeless encampments, and penalizing homeless people with fines and incarceration (Toolis & Hammack, 2015) . Therefore, excluding prejudices from our work represents a moral concern, as well as a theoretical one. Our science might even become isolated from the free flow of ideas that could inform and enhance our knowledge of prejudice.
Summary and implications
In sum, the proliferation of collective biases in prejudice research weakens our ability to generate strong theory and evidence, as well as to make a real difference in the broader society (Reicher, 2012) . When prejudice research is collectively biased in support of emergent ingroups, this institutionalized goal can supersede other important goals and agendas, such as developing comprehensive, integrated, and robust theories and evidence about prejudice. Social change offers us an opportunity to see how far we have come, but also how far we have to go, in our theoretical and empirical development. Without a free flow of knowledge into and out of prejudice research, the tools and products of our science are not truly democratized for the benefit of society as a whole (White & Crandall, 2017) . This is not an argument against specific researchers or certain types of work, but rather an argument on how shared, scientific biases can have unintended consequences for our collective knowledge and our ability to engage the public in a conversation about prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.
The resolution of collective biases requires asking questions about what content our scientific tools are -or are not -used to understand in society (Crandall et al., 2013) . It requires developing novel strategies for managing biased patterns of content in our theories and research. Thus, doubling-down on methods-oriented controls (such as preregistration and replication) will not be sufficient to prevent crises. Scientific biases cannot be reduced to individuals who fail to use methodological tools in the proper manner. What we need is a more social identity-sensitive science that taps into distinct variations of prejudice occurring across ingroup memberships and intergroup relations over time (Haslam, 2014) .
Discussion: Beyond collective biases
This Landmark article has examined the nature of scientific change in prejudice research. Based on the EIM, we argued that such research generally represents a form of collective, scientific action supporting emergent ingroups against their emergent outgroup opponents. The EIM describes the dynamic psychological processes that link social changes in intergroup boundaries with scientific changes in prejudice work. When mainstream researchers recategorize former outgroup members as part of an emerging ingroup in society, their scientific interests and practices shift in support of shared group interests. When theoretical concepts, data collection and interpretation, and practical interventions are narrowly used to detect and manage threatening outgroup emotions, prejudice work becomes collectively biased in support of ingroup members . Over time, this leads to a knowledge base that is narrow, fragmented, and unstable in the face of ongoing changes in intergroup relations (Reynolds et al., 2017) . It also weakens our ability to engage the public -to promote the flow of ideas between our field and the broader society (Dovidio, 2018) . When researchers are biased in a similar manner, they might not easily recognize their shared biases or consider them problematic for theory and research (Morton, Haslam, Postmes, & Ryan, 2006) . Indeed, as traditional scientific controls are better equipped to detect personal biases than collective ones, collective biases can persist across generations as taken-for-granted realities (Eagly, 2016) .
Thus, the EIM provides a social psychological perspective on why our science changes in certain ways, during specific periods in history. Research on social groups begins, continues, and ends in response to shifting intragroup and intergroup relationships within society (Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 2012) . When researchers perceive threats to emerging ingroup identities, they develop research to detect, understand, and manage those threats (Durrheim et al., 2016) . Indeed, perceived threat is likely to be higher for conflicts between emergent ingroups and emergent outgroups amid social change (Crandall et al., 2018) . As emergent ingroups become more established in society and protected by institutions, researchers lose interest in conducting research supporting these groups and such work slowly comes to an end (Mitchell & Tetlock, 2017) . Also, the EIM explains why a wide range of social groups who suffer from serious threats within society are rarely able to capture the interest of prejudice researchers -they are simply not recategorized as emergent ingroup members (Reicher, 2012) . These overt threats are overlooked or condoned by researchers, regardless of the prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination available for consideration (Jussim et al., 2016) . Such groups are left to other subfields of psychology that seem more oriented towards stability than change within society (Herek, 2010) .
The EIM perspective helps us to collectively reflect on our shared biases, as well as to initiate a larger discussion on the future of prejudice research. We can start to think about how collective biases have shaped concepts, data, and explanations. We might also start to think about promoting scientific controls and reward structures that are adept at the detection and management of group-level biases in research content (Duarte et al., 2015) . Indeed, a more social identity-sensitive science of prejudice would help us to build the relationships and evidence that we need to better understand the dynamics of intragroup and intergroup relations across societal contexts and over time (Reynolds, Jones, O'Brien, & Suba si c, 2013) . We now discuss some important clarifications and limitations of our EIM perspective.
Argument clarifications and limitations
It is important to clarify two potential misunderstandings of our EIM argument. First, our emphasis on studying a broader range of prejudices does not reflect moral or political relativism, but rather reflects the psychological relativity and veridicality of perception (Turner & Reynolds, 2010) . Social groups differ in their perception of reality as a function of their position in ongoing intergroup conflicts. This means that the EIM does not suggest that 'all prejudices are the same'; it suggests that prejudices differ in important and meaningful ways (e.g., power, legitimacy, and consequences for targeted groups). Collective biases encourage us to take these differences -as well as the intergroup relationships that give rise to them -for granted (Reynolds et al., 2017) . Given that social realities are partial, plural, and shaped by conflicts, it is necessary to examine the full range of prejudices in society to understand its manifestations across distinct intergroup contexts (Crandall et al., 2013) . Focusing on certain prejudices over others is like taking a road trip with only part of the map needed to reach the destination; it raises questions about whether we forgot the other part of the map or perhaps had another destination in mind (Longino, 2002) . The EIM helps us to minimize collective biases by sparking the development of more complete maps of the prejudice terrain, rather than discounting other parts of it that could be informative.
Second, our focus on collective biases in research content does not preclude the existence of such biases in research methods. These biases are easier to recognize and explain in terms of shifts in research content over time. We also do not believe that doubling-down on methods-based controls (Funder et al., 2014) -without greater scrutiny of research content -would be sufficient for resolving collective biases. Nonetheless, collective biases in research methods are clearly possible (Dixon, 2017; Haidt, 2016; Jussim et al., 2016) . The EIM perspective shows that such biases can influence the entire research process -creation of concepts, use of tools to collect data, interpretation of evidence, and its application in society. Indeed, this perspective is consistent with several other traditions (e.g., critical, discursive, and feminist) that recognize the influence of intergroup relationships on scientific researchers, practices, and institutions.
It is also important to point out that the EIM could help overcome some of the limitations of the social identity tradition. For instance, social identity work generally focuses on particular types of intergroup relations -those undergoing social change or dealing with broader political issues (Reynolds et al., 2017) . It seems equally important to understand intergroup relations that are characterized by social stability (e.g., doctorspatients, lawyers-drug users, or homeowners-homeless people). It also seems important to understand different intergroup relations altogether (e.g., sexuality-based identities, and close relationships whose success probably depends on the development and maintenance of a 'we'). Currently, other types of intergroup relations are left to other perspectives, such as system justification and evolutionary theories (Reicher, 2004) .
Of course, the EIM perspective has its own limitations. For instance, the EIM describes processes of incremental social change in democratic societies, where shifts in legitimacy will likely precede shifts in power (Turner, 2005; Tyler, 2015) . Thus, it is potentially less useful in describing the dramatic social change characteristic of wars, genocides, or colonialism where legitimacy and power could shift simultaneously. Furthermore, our EIM view has focused on expanding our maps of the prejudice terrain by studying other intergroup relations, as well as other social groups. This reflects our stronger critique of content-based collective biases than method-based ones. Nonetheless, in addition to expanding our current maps, we also need to consider developing and using different maps as well -those that track distinct aspects of the prejudice terrain. This would likely involve using a wider range use of research tools, such as discourse analysis (Augoustinos, 2016) and fieldwork (Drury & Reicher, 2018) , to track the emergence, maintenance, and dissolution of social identities in language and interaction. We now offer some suggestions for strengthening our work to help us achieve these goals.
Suggestions for empirical research
One potential way to strengthen theory and research on prejudice is to rethink the existing literature. For instance, it is important that researchers significantly broaden the representation of target groups in their work (Crandall et al., 2002) . This includes considering emotions targeting emergent outgroup members, as well as emergent ingroup members (Crawford, 2014) . Likewise, there is little work on how disadvantaged groups feel towards dominant groups or other subordinate groups (cf. Johnson et al., 2013) . This is not the same as examining targeted groups' perspectives (Swim & Stangor, 2007) where the emphasis is on subordinates' victimization, nor the same as subordinates' ingroup favouritism where the emphasis is on their ingroup evaluations (Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002) . Studying emotions held by subordinate group members could help us ascertain how emotions contribute to contesting established categorizations and broader social change efforts (Dixon et al., 2015; Wright & Baray, 2012) . There is also little work on how established ingroup members feel towards established outgroup members (e.g., how doctors or lawyers feel towards drug users or homeless people). Such work would help us to appreciate that 'prejudice' is not necessarily an 'outgroup problem' -where the label of prejudice is primarily used to describe those who remain opposed to the recategorization efforts that define an emergent ingroup . Examining emotions held by ingroups could allow us to learn how these emotions promote established categorizations and the status quo more generally.
Given our field's special emphasis on prejudices targeting emergent ingroup members, it might be helpful to get a clearer sense of the main ways that people are categorizing themselves and others in society (Crandall et al., 2002) . What group memberships actually matter to people (Cruwys et al., 2016) ? Do people mostly use age, gender, and ethnic categories -or do they use other social categories as well (e.g., climate believers vs. climate sceptics; Bliuc et al., 2015) ? How does this differ across the distinct sides of intergroup conflicts? Some researchers (Brandt et al., 2014; Crandall et al., 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) have started down this road by including a wider range of groups in their work. Beyond simply building our awareness of omitted groups, a 'social identity census' might illuminate whether understudied prejudices represent fundamentally different kinds of intergroup conflicts (realistic vs. symbolic; Stephan et al., 2016) or larger, more successful social change efforts (with differences in legitimacy, power, or leadership; Stroebe, Wang, & Wright, 2015) . Knowing how studied and unstudied social groups differ could offer novel theoretical insights into stability and change within society.
In addition, researchers could borrow from emotion regulation work to understand when people will attempt to shape collective emotional experiences and expressions (van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011) . Although social psychology knows much about the effectiveness of particular influence techniques (Harkins, Williams, & Burger, 2017) , less is known about how people choose techniques, as well as when they will use them, to shape collective emotions (Shields, 2013) . By taking a closer look at the collective emotion regulation within and between groups, we can better understand the factors that increase or decrease intergroup conflict within society (Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014) . In fact, greater social identity sensitivity could help us to rediscover and rethink classic research literatures (such as attitudes vs. emotion models of prejudice or the utility of emotional expression for prejudice reduction).
Suggestions for scientific practice
One potential way to strengthen the science behind prejudice research is to acknowledge that collective bias exists in our field. For instance, researchers need to reflect on their ingroup identities, particularly those that are most relevant to their work (Harding, 1993; Wilkinson, 1988) . The myth of social identity-free science could obscure the influence of one's own self-categories on how concepts are defined, what data are collected, and how those data are interpreted -even among thoughtful and well-intentioned researchers . When shared identities as emergent ingroup members appear under threat, we might take for granted why particular emotions are problematic (Tetlock & Arkes, 2004) , use claims of 'irrationality' as political attacks (Tileaga, 2014) , or offer suggestions for change based on shared assumptions (such as recommending individuation of groups despite knowing the problems associated with colour-blind perspectives; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Schofield, 1986) . We can be part of the solution by raising awareness of group-based biases in science, getting into the habit of reflecting on our own group identities and their place in our work, and being more attentive to possible conflicts of group interest in our field.
Another potential way to strengthen the science behind prejudice research is to take steps to manage collective bias. For instance, researchers need to collectively define the goals of the field, as well as to use these goals to facilitate decisions and evaluate scientific progress. One possible goal would be to prioritize theoretical relevance and importance above other possible goals (e.g., novel tools, statistical significance, or practical value for emergent ingroups). As researchers, we have an epistemic responsibility to develop strong theories that allow us to predict and explain the world (Dovidio, 2016) . By specifying our collective goals, we make it easier to communicate them to others, focus our collective efforts, and decide when scientific progress has been made (Finkel, Eastwick, & Reis, 2015) . A theoretical goal would help to foster a theoretical and empirical knowledge base that better tracks differences in ingroup memberships and intergroup relations, rather than simply valuing contributions that reaffirm emergent ingroup interests within the broader society (Mullen, Bauman, & Skitka, 2003) .
Summary and conclusion
In sum, an EIM perspective helps us to see how scientific changes in our concepts, data, interpretations, and interventions over time have been closely aligned with social changes in researchers' self-categorizations and their support for emergent ingroup members. Although social change-driven work has invigorated scientists, it also leaves us with a narrow theoretical scope and an unstable knowledge base, as well as few tools for detecting and managing these concerns in prejudice research. By broadening group representation and connecting with other literatures, we can begin to develop the kind of strong theory that will stand up across variations of group membership and intergroup relations. It will help us to step back and develop a more social identity-sensitive science, rather than falling prey to the myth of identity-free prejudice research. Different identities represent resources to help researchers make sense of intergroup conflict in society.
Although change is seldom easy, it is important that we reimagine our science to develop the kind of collective knowledge that we need to make a real difference in our rapidly changing and increasingly global world. This means that we need to be aware of our shared identities and their influence on our research. It also means that we need to seek people who self-categorize in different ways to help us identify possible collective biases in research. By becoming aware and seeking feedback, we have a greater chance of developing a robust foundation for our collective knowledge. In addition, we can clearly outline shared goals for our field and focus our efforts in ways that begin to remediate collective biases. If we can remain open to the possibility that what emotions appear 'rational' or 'prejudiced' changes over time, we can also ask ourselves whose suffering we are overlooking right now and how our lack of interest inadvertently contributes to it. Achieving our collective goals will require us to rethink our routine acceptance of shifting intergroup boundaries and how they have defined 'us' and 'them' in our work for decades.
